Table of Contents - Issue 3 by Chicago-Kent Law Review
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Volume 69 




Table of Contents - Issue 3 
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Chicago-Kent Law Review, Table of Contents - Issue 3, 69 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. i (1994). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol69/iss3/1 
This Front Matter is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of 
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons 




VOLUME 69 1994 NUMBER 3
CONTENTS
SYMPOSIUM ON
JOHN RAWLS'S POLITICAL LIBERALISM
PROFESSORS STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN AND LAWRENCE B. SOLUM
SYMPOSIUM EDITORS
INTRODUCTION: SITUATING POLITICAL
LIBERALISM Lawrence B. Solum 549
PLURALISM AND PROCEDURALISM Joshua Cohen 589
According to "democratic pluralism," fundamental moral disagreement is com-
patible with agreement on rules of a democratic political game, but not with agree-
ment on a more substantive conception of justice. According to Professor Cohen, this
is incorrect. Procedural and substantive values stand on a common footing in demo-
cratic thought: that is a fundamental lesson of A Theory of Justice and Political
Liberalism.
POLITICAL LIBERALISM AND THE POSSIBILITY
OF A JUST DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION Samuel Freeman 619
This article shows how Rawls, in order to carry through his original aim of provid-
ing the most appropriate conception of justice for a democratic society, develops the
ideas of overlapping consensus and public reason to compensate for a difficulty in the
argument for stability in A Theory of Justice. Professor Freeman also discusses
Rawls's positions on judicial review and the Supreme Court's role as the exemplar of
public reason.
ON PUBLIC REASON Kent Greenawalt 669
Professor Greenawalt focuses on Rawls's idea of public reason. After summariz-
ing and clarifying Rawls's position, Professor Greenawalt makes some criticisms,
which are largely directed at a distinction between constitutional essentials and mat-
ters of basic justice, on the one hand, and ordinary political issues, on the other. Fi-
nally, Professor Greenawalt suggests some ways to strengthen an account of the
constraint of public reasons.
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY VERSUS
POLITICAL THEORY: THE CASE OF RAWLS
Stephen M. Griffin 691
In this article, Professor Griffin examines the critique of Rawls's theory of justice
offered by several leading political scientists who work in the field of political theory.
This critique centers on the idea that Rawls's theory is not relevant to the real world
of politics. While this critique is not valid in its most general form, Professor Griffin
concludes that political scientists raise interesting issues that must be confronted by
anyone who engages in political philosophy.
RELATIVIZING RAWLS S.A. Lloyd 709
This article assesses an objection to Rawls's political liberalism mounted by Raz,
Baier, and Hampton.
RAWLS'S NEW THEORY OF JUSTICE Rex Martin 737
Professor Martin lays out the background and main features of Rawls's new the-
ory of justice. This is a theory he began adumbrating around 1980 and that is given its
fullest statement in his book Political Liberalism. The article makes a critical exami-
nation of the two main patterns of justification Rawls attempts to provide for his new
theory.
RETHINKING RAWLS'S THEORY
OF LIBERTY AND RIGHTS James W. Nickel 763
In his article, Professor Nickel examines and reconstructs Rawls's list of basic
liberties and rights. Professor Nickel then evaluates the adequacy of the scheme
Rawls provides for justifying his list and examines Rawls's account of how the basic
liberties should be interpreted and applied. Finally, Professor Nickel suggests that
Rawls's conception of the person should contain more than just two "moral powers."
PUBLIC REASON AND ABOLITIONIST
DISSENT David A.J. Richards 787
Critics of the role of public reason in John Rawls's Political Liberalism argue that
it fails to account for the historical role of religious argument in rights-based dissent
under American constitutionalism. In this article, Professor Richards examines the
pivotal role that public reason in fact played in central forms of antislavery, antiracist,
and antisexist abolitionist dissent, and shows that Rawls, in fact, offers much the bet-
ter account of both the antiestablishment character and morally independent trans-
formative power of such dissent than his critics. Professor Richards argues that
abolitionist dissent cannot reasonably be interpreted on the model of conventionally
mainstream religious argument.
